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24 September 1970

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] Office of Security

FROM : Support Services Historical Officer (SSHO)

SUBJECT : Informal review of selected chapters of the Overview volume of Security Program of CIA

1. Per your request, I have completed a review of Chapters I, II, and that portion of Chapter III of the Overview volume of the Security historical series. In general you are doing a creditable job of meeting the objectives which you set for yourself -- presenting in one volume the broad scope of developments which were encompassed in the security program designed specifically to meet the needs of this Agency. The reader should have some appreciation of the major problems faced in the attempt to operate a secure intelligence service and an appreciation of the backing, filling, and movement (of both personnel and organization) to meet those needs. Wisely, (although I will take some exception to this in a later paragraph) the specific aspects of the security program -- personnel security, physical security, technical countermeasures, and the other special activities -- are only being highlighted in this volume; and you make clear reference to the fact that details on the given topics will be handled in the subsequent selective volumes.

2. I also think that your introductory remarks are quite appropriate to the volume in question. Even though I have suggested several deletions, additions, or clarifications, I think that the philosophical flavor of your message is important for the reader.

3. As you will note in going through the copy, I have liberally applied the blue pencil as I thought necessary. Where the information appeared incomplete, out of context, repetitious, or unclear, I have not hesitated to suggest deletion (or clarification). I also have raised numerous questions about what has been said, or the way in which it has been said; but most of these questions will be relatively easy to resolve.

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4. One or two points which are of a more serious nature did turn up:

a. You will note that I have repeatedly asked for the inclusion of examples of some of the general points which you are making. I realize that the specific volumes on the particular subjects should provide adequate illustration, but even the general overview needs a few more case histories or other details that you have provided.

b. The end-of-chapter bibliographies are not going to be satisfactory. As you mentioned, some of your source references are given in full as a normal part of the text; and these present no problem. I would ask, however, that rather than continue the bibliographic system, the materials which you are using as basis for comments in the text be cited as individual source references. From the look of the bibliographic entries for Chapters I and II, I suspect that they might pretty well fall into order as source references.

5. I am also enclosing a copy of the memorandum which I received from the Deputy Chief, Historical Staff, [redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] regarding my review of your paper. Although some of his queries duplicate mine, he has posed a number of additional worthwhile questions and suggestions which you should consider.

6. When you have had time to digest the two reviews, I'll be happy to have another discussion session with you.

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[redacted]

Distribution:
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25X1 HS/DCI: [redacted] (24 September 1970)

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24 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SS/HO

SUBJECT : Informal review of draft of early chapters of the History of the Office of Security

1. These chapters nicely define the scope of the security problem, describe many of its ramifications, and trace the emergence of a centralized security service in the Agency. The introduction discusses the current aspects of these problems in a comprehensive and effective manner. Attention then shifts to the historical development of CIA security activities and organizations. In this discussion the organizational genealogy and mission are on the whole adequately traced. The transition from OSS to CIA is summarized succinctly and conditions are appropriately characterized as war-time, transitional, or in similar terms.

2. In many ways the draft is inquiring and analytical as well as descriptive. In other respects the history could be greatly strengthened, if the author answered the questions not only of when, where, and what happened, but if he pushed his inquiry further to explain more often why decisions were taken and changes were made. What, for example, was the story behind the backing and filling of the FBI in accepting responsibility for the investigation of prospective CIA personnel (pp. 65-66, 68)? At other times the question what is answered, but in too general a manner. What, for example, was the contribution which I&SO is said to have made to the drafting of EO 10501, for the safeguarding of official information (pp. 80-81)?

3. Although the history covers some very useful ground it leaves unanswered a number of important questions, such as the following:

(1) What kind of security information was regarded as most useful during OSS, SSU, and CIG period in making personnel investigations?

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(2) Were the contract agencies used to conduct investigations in the early period used primarily to collect information or did they also evaluate individual cases?

(3) How were decisions made in individual investigations? What rule of thumb or other tests were employed in such decisions? Can the changes in standards for CIA security checks be traced? Are present standards much different from early ones? In what respect?

(4) Reference is made to assistance from British experience in WW II. What kind of help did we get from the British? How much exchange of bona fides was there?

4. An important problem in writing this history as outlined will be to develop an appropriate division of labor between the overall volume and the functional histories that are to follow it. The advantage of preparing the overall summary first as a guide to the writers of the later volumes is apparent, but it might be more efficient to regard the summary as something which can best be written after the detailed volumes have been produced.

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[redacted]

Deputy Chief, CIA Historical Staff

Enclosures

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